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Commentaries
Dogmatism and the Death Penalty:
A Reinterpretation of the Duquesne Poll Data*
Milton Rokeach**
D. Daniel McLellant
In Witherspoon v. Illinois' the defendant asked the court to reverse
his conviction by a non-scrupled jury arguing that (1) the jury determin-
ing the guilt issue favored the death penalty; (2) those who favored
the death penalty were highly authoritarian, dogmatic personalties; and
(3) highly dogmatic jurors were "prosecution prone." From these
premises, the defendant concluded that his Sixth Amendment guarantee
to an impartial jury was denied by the non-scrupled jury determining
his guilt because it was "prosecution prone." The Court acknowledged
the defendant's first premise when it reversed his death sentence, but re-
jected the full argument because premises (2) and (3) had not been
proven to its satisfaction.
Cucinotta,2 testing the empirical validity of premise (2), concluded
that his data did not support it. It is our contention that premise (2)
is supported by Cucinotta's own data and by other data as well.
Following the Witherspoon analysis, Cucinotta categorized 188
Duquesne students into one of the four groups according to their
position on capital punishment, as follows:
Group A-non-scrupled veniremen who, if the defendant is found
guilty, favor ONLY the death penalty.
Group B-non-scrupled veniremen who favor the death penalty
but will consider life imprisonment as a penalty.
Group C-scrupled veniremen who oppose the death penalty but
- Preparation for this paper was facilitated by a grant from the National Science
Foundation to the senior author.
** Ph.D., University of California; Professor of Psychology, Michigan State University.
t B.A., Michigan State University; Research Assistant in Psychology, Michigan State
University.
1. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2.- Comment, -Witherspon-Will-the Due Procesi- Clauise Fiither Regulate the Imposi-
tion of the Death Penalty? 7 DUQUESNE L. Rv. 414 (1969).
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who could lay aside their feelings and impose the
death penalty.
Group D-scrupled veniremen who could never impose the death
penalty.
To test the premise that non-scrupled jurors are more highly dog-
matic than scrupled jurors, the Duquesne subjects were given the
Rokeach Dogmatism Scale. Cucinotta predicted he would find a statis-
tically significant linear correlation coefficient between Dogmatism
scores and Witherspoon position. That is, with each increase in will-
ingness to impose the death penalty he predicted an increase in average
dogmatism score. Following his analysis of the Duquesne Poll data,
Cucinotta concluded "that no significant relationship was found
between one's dogmatism level and one's position on capital punish-
ment ... even though there seems to be a slight trend toward a higher
dogmatic level when we move from response D to response A." 3 After
studying his data, we feel that Cucinotta's analysis is misleading and
that his data do, in fact, support the notion that non-scrupled jurors
are more dogmatic.
The absence of a significant linear correlation between the variables
seems to be due, in part, to the inability of the Witherspoon position
variable to differentiate among people who are at different points along
the attitudinal dimension, especially in the middle range. It seems
highly likely that extreme positions A and D are differentiated from
one another and from the middle positions, but that the middle posi-
tion B and C may not reliably tap attitudinal differences among the
majority who fall within the middle range. The failure to discriminate
middle positions could result in a failure to discriminate people on
the dogmatism variable, causing the correlation at this point to
"wash out."
Even if the Witherspoon position variable is reliable and valid, there
are other hypotheses which could be put forth which would not predict
a linear correlation. For example, it could be hypothesized that the
relationship between dogmatism and Witherspoon position is U-shaped
rather than linear, with individuals taking either extreme position
being more dogmatic than those taking more moderate and flexible
positions. It could also be hypothesized that positions B, C, and D
would not reflect differences in dogmatism because all these attitudinal
3. Id. at 430.
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positions are determined primarily by variables other than dogmatism
and are positions taken by rational and humane men whose differences
are minor when compared with one another. Position A, however,
could reflect more dogmatism compared with positions B, C and D, due
to the extremely rigid, hostile and unsympathetic stand taken. In this
case, we would predict that Group A would be more dogmatic than
any of the remaining three groups and these three groups would show
little differences among themselves. In other words, we think it more
reasonable to hypothesize such a difference in dogmatism rather than
a linear correlation between the two variables.
With these alternative hypotheses in mind, we reanalyzed Cucinotta's
published data4 and reached a conclusion opposite to that reached by
Cucinotta. We first asked if there were any differences in dogmatism
among any of the groups. To answer this, we used an analysis of
variance and concluded that there were significant differences. 5 That
is, our analysis showed that if there were no differences in average
dogmatism among the groups from which the subjects came, sample
differences as large as found would occur less than ten per-cent of the
time. Thus, we conclude that there are significant differences in
dogmatism among the four groups.
From the scatter-plot it is evident that Group A is more dogmatic,
on the average, than all other groups. Further analysis of the data
confirms this observation. One-tailed t-tests comparing the average
dogmatism score of Group A with Groups B, C, and D were computed
separately. The findings, all statistically significant, are as follows:
4. Our analysis was based on data provided in the scatter-plot. The total number of
subjects was 187 rather than 188 apparently due to the dropping of a score for one
Philosophy student from Group D in the scatter-plot. The mean dogmatism score for the
187 subjects was 144.82 which compares favorably to the mean found by Cucinotta of
144.08. This indicates that the error resulting from using the scatter-plot data was not
excessive.
5. We found an F-ratio = 2.12, which is significant at the .09 level of probability. Our
choice of significance level was chosen to reflect possible costs incurred in making errors
in our inference. We are susceptible to two types of error: Type I error-inferring that
differences exist where, in fact, none do exist and Type II error-failing to infer that
differences exist where there are real differences. Traditional significance levels of .05 or
.01 are inadequate here because they increase our chances of making a Type II error,
which is by far the more costly and serious. If we make a Type I error, we conclude that
real differences in dogmatism exist among our groups when there are no real differences.
If we make a Type 1I error, we conclude, as did the Supreme Court that there is not
enough evidence to indicate real differences in dogmatism when, in fact, real differences
do exist. The cost of making a decision based on the Type I error is negligible. The cost
of acting on the conclusion reached in making a Type II error is to continue to do nothing
to change the composition of capital juries, thus continuing to deny capital defendants
their constitutional rights to an impartial jury. This high cost made use of traditional
significance levels inappropriate for our statistical inferences.
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tAB= 2.48, df = 82, p < .01;
tAO = 1.92, df = 74, p < .05;
tAD =2.47, df = 60, p < .01.
If we had felt that only Group A would show more dogmatism, it
would have been appropriate to compare the average dogmatism score
of Group A to that of all the remaining subjects, regardless of their
Witherspoon position. This one-tailed t-test reveals a statistically sig-
nificantly higher average dogmatism score for Group A subjects than
for the remainder of the subjects:
tA(B+C+D) -2.53, df = 185, p < .01.
Further evidence to support the premise that non-scrupled jurors
are more dogmatic is given by Crosson.6 He assessed the differences
between actual jurors in Ohio who were either Death-Qualified (hold-
ing no scruples against imposition of the death penalty during voir dire
and thus eligible for capital jury service) or Death-Scrupled (ineligible
for capital jury service due to scruples against the imposition of the
death penalty). The Death-Qualified jurors were found to be more
dogmatic, on the average, than the Death-Scrupled jurors although this
difference failed to reach statistical significance.7 Thus, we have two
separate studies using different subject populations, which both sug-
gest strongly that there are differences in dogmatism between non-
scrupled and scrupled individuals.
Further evidence from Crosson adds credence to the hypothesis that
non-scrupled jurors are indeed different from scrupled jurors. H'e
found that non-scrupled jurors are significantly more conservative than
scrupled jurors. Other findings in the predicted direction showed that
scrupled jurors are better at evaluating verbal arguments and less
hostile than non-scrupled jurors. Crosson concludes:
The death qualification in the voir dire, instead of insuring impar-
tiality, seems rather to undermine the defendant's right to a fair
trial because of a personality selectivity which may predispose the
jury to his disadvantage.
Our main conclusion, based on a reanalysis of Cucinotta's Duquesne
6. R. F. Crosson, An Investigation into Certain Personality Variables Among Capital
Trial Jurors. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1966).
7. He found a critical ratio = 1.04, df = 71, p < .15. This failure to reach significance
at the .05 level is probably due to one of two factors or a combination of the two. One
factor is the small number of subjects used (N . 72) in the study. The other factor is the
"washing-out" of the differences due to the mixing of Witherspoon positions A and B.
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Poll data, is therefore, different from Cucinotta's conclusion: Group A
(non-scrupled individuals favoring imposition of the death penalty
ONLY), on the average, is found to be significantly more dogmatic than
the remaining three groups, considered separately or as a whole.
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